There has been concern in western countries over whether strong private property rights empower polluters to the detriment of other citizens. This debate is now playing out in transition economies and developing countries, where the process of moving to a market economy involves strengthening property rights. We review the conflicting arguments and test them using a new international data base. After controlling for income, education and political factors we find that cross-sectional differences in property rights regimes explain some international differences in pollution rates, but changes in property rights laws within a country do not seem to affect emissions.
Summary
In this paper we review some of the conflicting arguments over the way in which enhanced property rights may cause or prevent the degradation of the environment. One commonly-held view is that strong property rights empower polluters to the detriment of other citizens. Others have responded that, while enhanced private property rights give industrial polluters new powers they also endow landowners with legal protection against pollution and state-initiated resource degradation. Whether the overall effect is positive or negative for the environment is a matter of continuing debate. The question is of particular interest for transition economies and developing countries, where a part of the process of moving to a market economy is a reduced extent of state ownership and the strengthening of private property rights.
We review in some depth the political economy arguments concerning three aspects of the property rights-environment link: rights of ownership, rights to sue for torts and rights of compensation for expropriation. On each topic there have been conflicting views about whether these institutions help or hurt the environment, or whether they even have any effect at all.
We then test these arguments against an international data base which measures water pollution emissions in 1980 and 1993. Our empirical investigation focuses on water quality, which we expect to be more sensitive to changes in property rights law than air quality, since ownership of surface water is more clearly defined than ownership of the atmosphere. Our data base includes 65 countries, with observations in 1980 and 1993. The qualitative measures allow us to examine the distinct roles of security of ownership, viability of contracts and overall rule of law. These relate to, though do not precisely mirror, the three aspects of rights which have been the focus of the political and legal debates.
The first regression model looks at the data in first differences form, to examine the relationship between changes in legal structure and emission rates. In addition to property rights indexes we control for income, education and political factors. We find no evidence that within-country changes in the strength of property rights increases or decreases per-capita water pollution emissions. We then examine pure crosssectional differences in both sample years. Cross-country differences in property rights regimes do seem to explain some international differences in pollution rates, though the signs and magnitudes of the relationships are not all constant over time. We suggest some possible structural changes that might rationalize these results.
The transition towards a market economy is supported on numerous political and economic grounds. The present study is motivated by a desire to understand what sorts of environmental implications might follow from a strengthening of private property rights. Overall our findings suggest that the extension of civil and economic rights in transition economies is not, in itself, likely to cause significant impacts one way or the other, a point which may be helpful for governments administering the move towards a market economy.
Introduction
In this paper we review some of the conflicting arguments over the strength and sign of the relationship between enhanced property rights and the degradation of the environment. One commonly-held view is that strong property rights empower polluters to the detriment of other citizens. Others have responded that, while enhanced private property rights give industrial polluters new powers they also endow landowners with legal protection against pollution and state-initiated resource degradation. Whether the overall effect is positive or negative for the environment is a matter of continuing debate. We focus on three areas in which theoretical arguments have been ambiguous: ownership rights, laws of tort, and compensation for public expropriation, or "takings". The question is of particular interest for transition economies and developing countries, where a part of the process of moving to a market economy is a reduced extent of state ownership and the strengthening of private property rights.
We then test these arguments against an international data base which measures water pollution emissions in 1980 and 1993. Our empirical investigation focuses on water quality, which we expect to be more sensitive to changes in property rights law than air quality, since ownership of surface water is more clearly defined than ownership of the atmosphere. Our data base includes 65 countries, with observations in 1980 and 1993. The qualitative measures allow us to examine the distinct roles of security of ownership, viability of contracts and overall rule of law. These relate to, though do not precisely mirror, the three aspects of rights which have been the focus of the political and legal debates. After controlling for income, education and political factors we find that cross-sectional differences in property rights regimes explain some international differences in pollution rates, but changes in property rights laws within a country do not seem to cause significant changes in pollution emissions. Our findings suggest that the extension of civil and economic rights in transition economies is not, in itself, likely to have significant environmental implications, a point which may be helpful for governments administering the move towards a market economy.
The next section reviews the political and legal debate over the relationship between property rights and the environment. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and section 4 concludes.
Legal and Political Debates About Property Rights and the Environment

Ownership, Markets and Prices
Privatization of land creates a potential mechanism for preservation of environmental quality in the form of observable market value. When land is divided and held in severalty by individuals with clearly defined boundaries and rights, the possibility of transferal and sale arises. Water pollution, deforestation, and land contamination degrade market value. Therefore, ownership provides an incentive for good stewardship, and weak ownership rules may do the opposite. While the owner is the chief beneficiary of good stewardship, the public may also benefit to the extent that good maintenance of one site positively impacts other sites in the vicinity.
For these reasons, it commonly held that "private ownership is the most effective protector of the environment-provided that ownership is transferable and backed by courts..." (Stroup and Shaw, 1996) . An owner's interest in market value also creates long-term interest in environmental quality. Because market value is based on measures of the present value of future benefits, "[p]roperty rights provide longterm incentives for maximizing the value of a resources, even for owners whose personal outlook is shortterm." (Stroup and Shaw, 2000) .
State ownership is widely relied upon to protect natural endowments, but critics of this approach can point to ample evidence of abuse of prerogative and poor management of government land holdings in Canada and the United States (e.g. Brubaker 1995) . Government agencies typically have conflicting objectives which impair efficient management decisions. An undue focus on job creation, economic development, and generation of tax revenue may distort resource extraction and utilization decisions. Also, it is very difficult for a government acting as lessor to give forestry firms an incentive to take a long-term stewardship interest in land they do not own and may not have access to once current leases expire (British Columbia, 1991) .
Those who see public ownership of land and resources as a key contributor to land degradation usually assume that the problems of free-riding are insurmountable. Others, however, question the applicability of the free-rider problem to "communally owned" land, an arrangement often observed in developing countries. Anthropological and sociological investigations into cultures that have lacked formal property rights have found numerous examples where communal ownership did not entail environmental ruin (Ostrom 1990 ). Communal ownership does not imply open access, instead it is usually characterized by some form of exclusion against "outsiders", along with equitable and joint ownership for "insiders."
Supporters of communal ownership believe it can be superior to both privatization and state ownership.
Government management of resource systems often fail because of an inability to acquire adequate information and an inability to avoid contaminated incentives for regulatory principals. Users of the common-pool resource on the other hand may be in a good position to gather and process the needed information, and they have a clear interest in the conservation of resource quality. It seems reasonable, then, that when users are able to devise their own regulations and engage in effective group monitoring, incentives exist to promote sustainability and efficiency. Furthermore, in some of these situations a switch to purely private ownership may degrade environmental quality, if there are significant externalities to resource use and individual owners cannot coordinate with each other (Ostrom 1990) . Analogies with the well-known "common pool" problem in oil field exploitation, support this possibility.
Communal ownership mechanisms have been subject to less formal economic analysis than private and state management regimes. They often involve complex social norms that develop locally, but may lack systematic features or transferability to other settings, and lack the theoretical underpinnings of private ownership. But since the social norms generally inhibit opportunistic behaviour, sympathetic observers feel that these self-governed commons have the potential to increase social welfare beyond that of private property or government ownership.
Overall, clear rules of private ownership have been suggested as a key motivating factor for environmental stewardship, especially in developed country contexts like the US, and especially in contrast to state ownership. With respect to site-specific resource management the evidence in favour of this view is very strong. However in settings where there are functioning forms of communal ownership, privatization may be no better and possibly worse in terms of restraining exploitation of a commons, and in dealing with externalities across property lines.
Laws of Tort and the Defence of Environmental Quality
Externalities across property lines can be dealt with under the doctrines of nuisance and trespass.
These determine one's right to exclude others from resource appropriation or access to one's property.
They are conditional on the parallel rights of other property owners. Theoretically, trespass law may be used to protect oneself against any encroachment by industry or government that results in any substance or structure invading the boundaries of one's property on, above or below the surface (to a reasonable degree -for example, an airplane at normal height above one's property does not constitute a trespass). Typically, the nature of the encroachment is irrelevant to the legal decision, as most judges have historically decreed that an instance of encroachment alone is sufficient to warrant an injunction.
The concern of this study is trespass that results in some form of pollution or environmental degradation.
When a landowner's holdings have been damaged by another, whether or not the landowner wishes to preserve nature is of no consequence. Because damage has been inflicted on one's personal property, and because that individual, by virtue of trespass law, has the right to seek an injunction, there exists a strong incentive to contest the activities of the offending neighbour. That the neighbour has harmed the environment is coincidental. If a judge determines that a trespass has indeed taken place, then the trespasser must cease those activities that result in the offense. This is the basis on which trespass law may be harnessed to protect natural resources.
Where a landowner's capacity to enjoy the property is impeded but no trespass has taken place, nuisance law (or "riparian" law in dealings of moving bodies of water on one's property) may nevertheless impose liability on the injuror. The principle that "in using one's property, another's enjoyment must not be compromised" (Brubaker, 1995, p. 41) , has been widely adhered to in North American legal history.
Brubaker documents some of the relevant precedents and shows that, at least until the late 1950's in Canada, judges refused to condone the negation of nuisance law in the name of another form of right or public interest. Since the latter half of the twentieth century, the "public" interest has increasingly been allowed to outweigh the damage inflicted on a property owner. This change was due in large part to specific direction from legislatures. This prioritization of conflicting interests facilitated a weakening of nuisance law in the area of water contamination. For instance, a new law introduced in Ontario in 1956 enabled sewage projects to operate under statutory authority even if they sent contaminated water through downstream properties. This had the effect of freeing polluters from liability for damages (Brubaker, 1995, p. 86) .
Those who espouse property rights-based solutions for environmental contamination usually advocate stronger nuisance and trespass laws (Brubaker 1995, Meiners and Yandle 1998) . The bulk of the decisions that have compromised nuisance and trespass law have been justified by appeals to "public interest". Advocates of strong private property rights assert that an efficient outcome is most likely to be accomplished through the allocation of property rights to victims over polluters. After an injunction has been sought and issued, the divergence between marginal damages and benefits will compel the polluter to negotiate with the injured parties. This would result in full compensation and an economically efficient balance of public and private interests.
Laws that weaken private property rights, and thus polluters' liability, remove incentives to curtail pollution or prevent accidents. However, the Coase Theorem (Coase 1962) states that the assignment of rights should not affect the level of pollution. Regardless of whether the law of nuisance or the right to pollute is paramount, private bargaining ought to result in an efficient outcome (assuming low transaction costs). Hence, even if a polluter is granted the defense of statutory authority, the victim could pay the polluter not to pollute until marginal damages equal marginal benefits. The implication of the Coase theorem, then, is that the strength of nuisance and trespass laws should have no effect one way or the other on observed pollution levels. Usher (1998) develops this point further, arguing that Coase's theorem implies not only that the outcome is the same regardless of which party has the rights but even whether the rights exist for either party. A contractual agreement to "create" rights produces a surplus that can be split to yield a Pareto-improvement. Hence parties have an incentive to bargain over control of the externality even in the absence of pre-existing property rights. Specifying property rights where none previously existed may simply change the rules for sharing a surplus, rather than changing the level of control of the externality.
Finally, the laws of tort are primarily applicable to disputes between neighbours: they may be of limited use in controlling environmental pollution. For instance, courts will be reluctant to provide a remedy based on liability if it is difficult to trace causality between the source and the resulting contamination (Menell 1991 , Dewees 1992 . When there are many contributors to an injury, a victim can make a claim against them all, and a court will have to apportion responsibility somehow. The courts have never found a way to do this that provides the correct marginal incentives for injurers to take efficient levels of precaution (Miceli and Segerson 1991) . Also, firms can in some cases make themselves effectively "judgement proof" if their assets are too small to make good on a damage award. Alberini and Austin (1998) find that in the US, increases in the stringency of state-specific liability provisions have apparently increased the spill rate for some hazardous substances. In the presence of more stringent liability requirements, some firms may subcontract handling of hazardous chemicals to small firms with limited capital. Since these firms tend to be less equipped to handle dangerous chemicals safely, there may be an increase in spill rates associated with a strengthening the rights of victims to sue for damages.
The main line of argument with respect to laws of tort is that strengthening these institutions ought to aid in environmental protection. But the Coase theorem suggests that such laws will have a neutral impact on pollution, and in cases of pollutants dispersed in air and water the courts may not be able to provide any remedy if causality between emissions and damages is difficult to establish. Hence changes to tort law may have little effect on pollution emissions.
Regulation, Takings and Compensation
Strengthening the overall legal framework pertaining to property can protect environmental quality by countering the well-known "tragedy of the commons" and by slowing the conversion of land away from pristine conditions towards urban uses. But these changes can also create problems associated with the definition of regulatory takings. Because land use regulations can inhibit how a property owner may enjoy his or her land, market values of property are very sensitive to restrictive regulations. Government legislation can distort incentives for landowners by affecting land valuations in the market place. Some prominent examples in North America are statutes that protect wetlands or endangered species. The US Constitution requires that where private lands are taken for public purposes, compensation must be paid.
There is a long-standing debate over what constitutes a "taking" and thereby warrants compensation to the landowner (see Innes et. al. 1998) . Expropriation of title obviously is a taking, but landowners have successfully argued in court that if a law leaves the property in private hands but diminishes its value, that too may be a taking. Since many laws causes at least some change in property values, there is a concern that the requirement to compensate for any reduction in property value poses too onerous a burden on the public and will prevent implementation of beneficial regulation, including those related to emissions control.
Some observers feel that the government has the right to legislate for the common good, and therefore compensation for takings is unwarranted. Simply put, with the enactment of restrictive laws "some costs will inevitably fall on property owners." (Meltz, 1995, p. 3) . A concern is that compensation laws will result in payments to individuals or enterprises not to violate the property rights of owners. It is held that "...a property owner has no right to harm others, and taxpayers should not have to reimburse him for the money he might make by doing so." (Searchinger, 1992, p. 1) . A common rebuttal is that the laws of tort still exist, and they cannot be rendered obsolete by takings law. A property owner would not be compensated for the restriction of activities that constitute a violation of another's property rights.
However, there may be practical or other impediments to legal assertions of property rights. In such a case, compensation for regulatory takings may result in payments to those who were polluting excessively. The fact that the legislatures in North America have weakened tort remedies for defending riparian rights, thereby facilitating polluting activity and creating an expectation of compensation if the activity must be curtailed, adds some weight to this argument.
Whether the type of compensation that occurs under takings law is justifiable or not, there is no doubt that regulatory takings can have profound effects on market values, and hence the amount of compensation under dispute could be substantial. This may be a disincentive to pass bills for environmental conservation. Environmentalists fear that takings laws could "cause financially strapped government agencies to stop regulating private industry..." 1 and "make it too expensive for government to regulate in the public good." (Howell-Coleman, 1998, p. 1).
By contrast, proponents of private property rights argue that it is unfair to make private property owners bear the costs of public regulation: "if a government wants property for the public good, the public must pay for the property." (Lund, 1995, p. 4) . This has an economic rationale, in that a strict rule for compensating takings limits society to potentially Pareto-improving changes. Economists argue, moreover, that inadequate compensation for takings may cause environmental quality to fall. Landowners who face financial risk due to species protection laws have an incentive to hinder the collection of information needed to identify endangered species habitat, and in some cases may actively destroy habitat pre-emptively (Brown and Shogren 1998) . The optimal level of compensation is not necessarily 100 percent of developed value, however, since landowners expecting perfect compensation may thereby have an inadequate incentive to optimally delay development if there is a positive probability that a rare public amenity will be discovered (Blume et. al. 1984) .
Overall the environmental effect of strong takings compensation rules seems to run in two directions. It ties the hands of a regulator since it raises the cost of rule-changes, but it also mitigates perverse incentives for destruction of sensitive habitat.
This brief review has highlighted the ambiguous predictions being made regarding the effects of stronger property rights on environmental quality. Since one aspect of the development process is the strengthening of private property rights, especially in cases involving a transition from a centrally planned regime to a market economy, it would be helpful to examine whether the data help decide between these conflicting views. The next section presents empirical evidence focused on water pollution emission rates.
Section 3. Empirical Model
Our dependent variable measures total emissions of organic water pollutants in grams per capita per day. Water pollution is particularly relevant in discussions of property rights because specific waterways traverse and abut private property, which is not the case with air pollution. We obtained emissions data for 65 countries for 1980 and 1993 from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 1998). The water pollution data were originally compiled by Hettige, Mani and Wheeler (1997) though some data were added to the file more recently and pertain to periods as late as 1998.
In the regression examining changes over time we had to delete countries for which data did not exist in one year or the other. Unfortunately this led to the exclusion of former Soviet countries, so for instance Germany was excluded from this sample. However some former Soviet countries are included in the cross-sectional regressions presented below. Security of ownership relates to the first and third topics surveyed in the previous section. The viability of contracts relates indirectly to the strength of tort law, since tort law is an extension of contract law, dealing with harm in cases where there was no prior agreement on terms of payment (Cooter and Ulen 1988) . The rule of law is not specifically tied to the right of ownership or takings compensation, though it does indicate the extent to which governments deal fairly with citizens, which may include compensating those who lose from policy changes.
The remaining independent variables control for economic and social factors. Two Political Rights indices from Freedom House (1980, 1993) were used, showing strength of political rights, and the depth of civil liberties. Each index has a descending scale of 1-7. Lower ratings are associated with stronger rights.
In order to obtain a single index with an ascending scale, the indices were added together and subtracted from 14. This results in an index measuring general political rights with a scale of 0-12, where greater rights are indicated by higher values. Per-capita income, as measured by real GDP per capita in constant 1985 US dollars, was obtained from the Penn World Tables (Heston and Summers 1995) . Finally, the effects of education on local environmental quality has been noted in a number of settings (Dasgupta and Wheeler 1996) . We controlled for this by inclusion of the rate of adult literacy, as obtained from UNESCO data (1980, 1993) .
The data are first used in the form of differences between 1980 and 1993. Differencing removes the fixed effects, but because pollution data were not available from some countries for both years the size of the sample fell to 49. The data are presented in Table 1 and summary statistics are in Table 2 . The regression equation is Because of the reliance on qualitative data, and the small sample size, there is a possibility that the property rights indexes might be insignificant because of excess noise. To investigate this we ran separate regressions for the data in levels form on the 1980 and 1993 subsamples, focusing only on income and the property rights variables. The results are in Tables 4 and 5 . Here the relationships attain significance in some cases, and the contrasts between cross-sectional and dynamic effects are instructive.
The previous regression showed that a higher initial income level is associated with a larger reduction in emissions, but the 1980 data show that a higher income level is associated with a higher initial pollution level, and the 1993 data suggest the correlation between income and pollution is positive but insignificant. This pattern may suggest a cross-country pollution-income relationship that was positively correlated initially but over time is approaching neutrality (see Figure 2a ).
In the case of ownership rights, the stronger they are in 1980 the lower emissions are (insignificantly); growth in these rights reduces pollution further (insignificantly), yet in 1993 strong ownership rights are positively and significantly associated with emissions. A possible rationalization is that the static cross-country relationship was initially neutral but is becoming positive (see Figure 2b ). This possibility points to the general importance of not drawing dynamic conclusions from cross-sectional data alone.
The contracts index is positively and significantly correlated with water pollution rates in 1980, but negatively and insignificantly correlated in 1993. Again, the within-period relationship seems to have changed in an interesting way, though it yields an insignificant differential pattern (see Figure 2c ).
In 1980, a stronger overall rule of law is significantly associated with higher pollution, and in 1993 the relationship remains positive and significant. Since the differential relationship is insignificant, some countries likely experienced a reduction in pollution while the rule of law strengthened. One possible such outcome is illustrated in Figure 2d .
Conclusions.
The legal and political literature has produced conflicting, but compelling, arguments on the relationship between property rights and pollution. These conflicting perceptions are reflected in the data, hence generalizations about stronger property rights having uniformly beneficial or deleterious effects on the environment should be avoided. We do not dispute that landowners take better care of their property than public agents working with mixed motives, and strong rights to prosecute nuisance and trespass torts have served to internalize pollution externalities among neighbours. But property rights affect incentives in a variety of ways, some of which can also, ceteris paribus facilitate increased emissions, at least of water contaminants. Overall we find that within a period the legal regime has significant influences on water pollution emission rates, but changes over time in these regimes apparently have insignificant effects compared to the influence of general economic conditions. While more work is needed on a broader list of contaminants, and on larger cross-sectional samples, our data suggest that the environmental implications of a transition to stronger private property rights are likely to be small. 
